Copyright, DMCA. My partner Joe Laferrera has written a Client Advisory discussing the 8th Circuit’s decision in Blizzard Entertainment v. Jung, where the court held that the defendant’s efforts to reverse engineer Blizzard’s Internet gaming network in order to provide a competing, alternative network had (a) violated Blizzard’s shrink-wrap agreement, which prohibited reverse engineering, and (b) violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).

This is an important case in the rapidly developing jurisprudence of the DMCA. As well, it demonstrates once again the courts’ apparent willingness to enforce shrink-wrap licenses, and to permit copyright owners to use those licenses to override rights otherwise permitted by the Copyright Act.

  • Read the case here.
  • Read the Advisory here.

Continue Reading Blizzard Entertainment v. Jung – Gamers Enjoined From Creating a Compatible Internet Environment

GEICO v. Google Over Adlinks

by Lee Gesmer on August 19, 2005

Trademarks. Google sells other companies’ trademarks as “keywords” on its Internet search engine. Whenever someone types in one of these keywords, such as GEICO, not only will Google’s search results show links to GEICO’s web site, but Google also will show advertising for other insurance companies under a banner called “Sponsored Links.” For example, when writing this blog, we searched “GEICO” on Google’s site and were shown paid links to two of GEICO’s competitors, USInsuranceonline.com and InsureMe.com.

Understandably, GEICO protested this practice of using its trademarks to direct consumers to its competitors. Given that 80% of Google’s revenues derive from this “AdWord” program (in turn causing Google to become a Wall Street darling, up three-fold in a year), Google refused to cease and desist, at which point GEICO sued for trademark infringement and unfair competition.

After a bench trial (translation: no jury) in federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia in December 2004, the Judge ruled “from the bench” (translation: she delivered her decision orally in court) that GEICO had failed to establish that the use of its trademarks only to direct Google searchers to competitors created consumer confusion (the talisman of a trademark violation). However, she ruled that Google had violated the law when a competitor used GEICO’s name in the heading or the text of the ads. Judges can be very slow, and the Judge’s written opinion was released only last week, over eight months after the trial. For all practical purposes, however, the written decision adds little to what the Judge said in December. In time-honored fashion, both GEICO and Google declared her ruling a victory.

Unfortunately, while the trademark community (yes, there is such a thing) was hoping for clarification as to the reasoning behind the judge’s oral ruling, it may still be mostly in the dark after reading the opinion.

While the opinion excoriates the design and methodology underlying the survey evidence GEICO presented at trial to show confusion (survey evidence is standard stuff in trademark cases – its how a party shows that the public has been “confused,” or not) the Judge relies on the same flawed survey in finding a likelihood of confusion between GEICO’s marks and the Google Sponsored Links in which GEICO’s marks appear in the headings or text. What’s disappointing is the decision’s failure to provide a thoughtful legal analysis of the issue that can be a guide to other online advertisers.

The parties have 30 days to settle this dispute before the trial resumes to determine whether Google or its advertisers are liable for the infringement and the damages, if any, to which GEICO may be entitled. Google faces a big gamble in continuing with the trial – if the Court finds Google liable and awards damages to GEICO, the litigation floodgates will open as other trademark owners sue Google for infringement of their marks. This volume of litigation would put Google’s entire business plan at risk. Common sense suggests that the parties will settle this dispute, with each (need I say it?) claiming victory.

  • Read the opinion here.
  • An extensive legal analysis of the decision appears on Professor Eric Goldman’s blog, here.

Continue Reading GEICO v. Google Over Adlinks

Electronic Discovery – The New New Thing

by Lee Gesmer on July 21, 2005

Procedure. There are fads in the law, just like everywhere else. Apologies to Michael Lewis, but there can be no doubt that, in the odd and insular world inhabited by litigators, electronic discovery is the new, new thing, and almost everyone is scrambling to catch up. It is what Y2K was from 1997 to January 1, 2000, but unlike Y2K, it’s not going away anytime soon.

It easy to tell what’s hot in litigation: just watch publications like the National Law Journal and the American Lawyer and look for frequent articles on the “hot topics.” Google “electronic discovery” and you get 354,000 hits.

I’ll be writing more about electronic evidence and discovery, but for now it’s worth noting that if you want to learn about this subject one resource stands tall: Kroll Ontrack.

Kroll makes an effort to track and digest every case involving electronic discovery and computer forensics (look here to see this lengthy document, which can be sorted by topic or jurisdiction). Others, such as Lexis, are not far behind.

You can sign up for Kroll’s newsletter here.

And, if that’s not enough, you can order the monograph authored by two Kroll-employed attorneys, Electronic Discovery: What Every Lawyer Should Know. This 250 page book should make for a pleasant weekend of reading if you feel you really need to get up to speed on this topic.

I should note that the Foreword to this monograph was written by Ken Withers, a friend, attorney, former Bostonian, and for many years now Senior Judicial Education Attorney at the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C.

Continue Reading Electronic Discovery – The New New Thing

Copyright. Sexy: Internet file sharing systems, Grokster, sampling, The Wind Done Gone, fair use, the legal standard for non literal infringement of computer source code.

Not sexy: copyright protection for parts numbering systems.

Yet, believe it or not, from time to time clients do ask whether parts numbering systems are protected.

Lewis Clayton at Paul Weiss has written an article (published in the July 8, 2005 issue of the National Law Journal), discussing several recent cases dealing with parts-numbering systems and the “merger doctrine” under U.S. copyright law.

  • Read the article here

Continue Reading Copyright Law and Parts Numbering Systems (yawn…)

Patents. What should the federal courts look at first in construing the terms used in a patent, the patent specification contained in the patent itself, dictionaries or treatises? If this seems like asking how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, you’re right, but in the cloistered word of patent lawyers and judges, the answer to this question can mean the difference between failure and success. This was the issue addressed by the Federal Circuit (which handles all patent appeals in the U.S.) in the July 12, 2005 decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.

My colleagues David Jacobs and Joe Laferrera have written a short client advisory discussing this case.

  • Read the Client Advisory here
  • Read the decision here

Continue Reading "Dictionaries First, Dictionaries Second, Never Dictionaries"

The Wayback Machine and the DMCA

by Lee Gesmer on July 14, 2005

Copyright, Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Quick now, what’s a good legal strategy when you’re involved in a bitterly contested trade secret, copyright and trademark case? Sue the lawyers on the other side, accusing them of hacking, of course. At worst, you’ll distract them and knock them off their game; at best, you’ll force their disqualification, pushing them out of the case and making your opponent go to the expense and inconvenience (not to be underestimated) of hiring new counsel and and getting them up to speed on the case.

And, it doesn’t matter that your suit may be borderline or even frivolous. Every experienced lawyer knows that in the American legal system the risks of being sanctioned for bringing a frivolous suit are only slightly higher than finding a hundred dollar bill on a Times Square sidewalk during lunch hour.

So, what happened here? First, there is an underlying trademark and trade secret suit between the similarly named “Healthcare Advocates” and “Health Advocate” that is of no particular interest to anyone except the parties. One of the issues is whether Healthcare published its alleged trade secrets on the Internet in the late 1990′s. Health Advocate, the defendant, is represented by the Harding Earley law firm, the lawyers who are at the receiving end of the lawsuit in question.

Seeking to investigate Healthcare’s publications on its Internet site in the late ’90′s, Harding Earley used the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine” to research Healthcare’s old web sites. The Wayback Machine (described in detail by Wikipedia here) is a remarkable Internet resource. Recognizing that old web pages disappear and that the early days of the Internet would be lost if they weren’t preserved, in 1996 the Wayback Machine began archiving the Internet for posterity, and thus far it has archived a petabyte of data – (the equivalent of 500 billion pages of standard printed text. (It’s also worth mentioning that the Internet Archive includes live music. The “live music archive” section of the site contains 2,886 live performances by the Grateful Dead. If you can’t wait to get started, click here).

If you own a web site and for some reason you don’t want to be archived by the Wayback Machine, you can opt out. The Wayback Machine permits website administrators to use the voluntary SRE (Standard for Robot Exclusion) to identify files or directories that cannot be “crawled” and indexed. Exclusion is accomplished by inserting a file called robots.txt on a web server. According to Internet.org this not only prospectively excludes a site from being crawled, but will “exclude any historical pages from the Wayback Machine.”

To return to our story, the case against Health Advocate was filed in 2003. Healthcare had been operating a website since 1998. In early July 2003, the robots.txt instructions were inserted by Healthcare. The next day (coincidence?) Harding Earley used the Wayback Machine to access Healthcare’s website material. Harding Earley hit the Healthcare site (using the Wayback Machine) very aggresively, and the robots.txt instruction failed to completely bar Harding Earley from accessing this material, nor did it warn the lawyers that the Healthcare material was “off limits.” The Harding Earley lawyers admit, however, that they had to “hit” the Healthcare URL repeatedly in order to gain access to it.

Fast forward two years, leaving out unimportant details. In early July 2005, based on the conduct described above, Healthcare filed suit against Harding Earley in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey.

Most of Healthcare’s claims against the lawyers are hardly worth discussing (Trespass? Intrusion Upon Seclusion? Yeah, right…).

The only claim that might have merit is that Harding Earley violated the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA). Section 1201(a) of the DMCA states: “No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a [copyright] work protected under this title.” Healthcare claims that robots.txt is a technological measure that controls access to the archived copies of its web site, and that the Harding Earley law firm circumvented that measure.

There are several problems with this argument. First, it’s not clear that Harding Earley took any affirmative steps to “circumvent” robots.txt, or that the law firm was even aware that Healthcare had attempted to restrict access to the material. In other words, Harding Earley did not use some form of de-encryption technology (common to DMCA claims). Did creating an automated script to hit the site repeatedly constitute circumvention under the DMCA?

Second, the DMCA defines a technological measure as one that “effectively protects a right of a copyright owner . . . if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of the copyright owner under this title.” It’s not certain that the Standard for Robot Exclusion (implemented by robots.txt), a voluntary protocol, meets the DMCA’s definition of a technological measure. Moreover, the fact that the law firm got access simply by accessing the URL may suggest that the technological measure was not “effective.”

Third, since the archived website was accessed in connection with discovery in pending litigation, there may be no claim for copyright infringement. Absent the potential for copyright infringement, at least one case decided under the DMCA (Chamberlain v. Skylink) suggests that mere access to protected content may be insufficient to trigger the DMCA. As the Court noted in that case, the DMCA provides an additional avenue of protection for copyrightable content, but does not create a new property right.

Fourth, the lawyers can argue that it is significant that the web site content in question was fully and publicly accessible for five years. They may be able to argue that the the content was effectively licensed to the public or placed in the public domain when it was originally put on the web site, undermining the argument that the defendant’s access to it was in some way unauthorized.

Fifth, the plaintiff’s DMCA claim is clearly not what was contemplated by the law. The DMCA has traditionally (to the extent that term can be used for a statute of relatively recent vintage) been used to protected encrypted content, not external locks used to limit access to that content. Aggresive use of the DMCA in unanticipated ways is nothing new, but thus far has failed. Plaintiffs have unsuccessfully attempted to use the DMCA to prevent the sale of aftermarket printer cartridges and software codes embodied in garage door openers. We predict a similar conclusion is the likely outcome in this case.

Lastly, it’s worth noting that plaintiff’s theory, if successful, would discourage archivists like the Internet Archive from using voluntary measures like robots.txt upon pain of creating a DMCA violation if the measure fails, and therefore would open a host of copyright issues for the Archive that could endanger its existence.

Thanks to Joseph Laferrera, who has written a number of insightful articles on the DMCA (Court Limits Reach of DMCA – The Chamberlain Case and Court Preserves Aftermarket Competition Under the DMCA – The Lexmark Case), for his assistance in preparing this piece.

For some additional interesting commentary on this case by Rebecca Bolin, see LawMeme, here.

Continue Reading The Wayback Machine and the DMCA

Interview With Tim Berners-Lee

by Lee Gesmer on July 12, 2005

Technology. Tim Berners-Lee is widely recognized as the inventor of the World Wide Web. Today, he is the Director of the World Wide Web Consortium, Senior Researcher at MIT‘s CSAIL, and Professor of Computer Science at Southampton ECS.

Mr. Berners-Lee’s current project is the development of a Semantic Web, a dramatic enhancement of the current web which is described in detail here.

This Spring (2005) my partner Andrew Updegrove interviewed Mr. Berners-Lee regarding the Semantic Web.

Continue Reading Interview With Tim Berners-Lee

Copyright Law. Following the Supreme Court’s June 27, 2005 decision in MGM v. Grokster I wrote a short article about the case, in the style of a client consulting a lawyer about a file-sharing system.
Attorney: Judy, what brings you to my office today?
Client: John, I have an exciting idea, and I want to run it by you to make sure it passes legal muster. I’ve been involved in indie music and film for years; I have hundreds of contacts in the entertainment industry. People don’t realize what a huge body of uncommercialized work is out there!
I’ve developed the most radical peer-to-peer file-sharing software you can imagine. It makes
Napster, Grokster, Morpheus and all of the others look medieval by comparison. I think that musicians and video producers will contribute their works to this network to get publicity. My revenue model will be based on banner advertising. It’s perfect! I have no cost of inventory – my only costs are computers, networking, and sales commissions for my ad reps. The best thing is that although anyone can put their files on my network, the technology creates proprietary file structures, so that people can’t grab my files, convert them into MP3s, and publish them on a competing system.

Attorney: Judy, this sounds very promising. However, there are some legal issues that we should discuss. You know that on June 27th the Supreme Court issued its decision in the Grokster case?

Continue Reading The Supreme Court’s Grokster Decision – A Conversation With a Client

Trademark Law. Last year I wrote (together with Susan Mulholland, an attorney at my firm), an article on the WhenU line of cases. We reviewed the three legal decisions that had been published to date on the WhenU technology: two from the district courts in Virginia and Michigan holding that WhenU’s practice was permissible; and one, from the federal district court in New York holding that WhenU had violated the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute.

What does WhenU do that resulted in three federal court cases? In brief, once downloaded by a user (concealed in a “Trojan Horse” application), WhenU’s software will continuously monitor (invisibly, to the user) the user’s Internet browser to determine whether content accessed by the user matches key words stored in WhenU’s client directory. When the software finds a match for an associated key word – often a trademark or service mark – it triggers the SaveNow program to transmit a WhenU-branded pop-up ad to the user’s computer. The pop-up ad is selected from a list supplied by WhenU’s advertising clients, and may be a competitor of the owner of the mark that triggered the pop-up. The pop-up ad provides a hyperlink to the web site of WhenU’s client that, if clicked on, results in the competitor’s web site opening on the user’s computer.

That was enough to send U-Haul, Wells Fargo and 1-800 CONTACTS running to court in protest. Unfortunately, they had only federal trademark law as the basis for their complaint, and the courts in Virginia and Michigan held that since WhenU didn’t “use” their trademarks in a way that was visible to potential customers — that is, it never actually displayed the trademarks — preliminary injunctions were inappropriate.

The New York federal district court disagreed, and issued a preliminary injunction.

The Second Circuit reversed that preliminary injunction on June 27, 2005, permitting WhenU to resume its use of the 1-800-CONTACTS trademark in this manner. In brief, the Second Circuit held that there was no trademark infringement because the WhenU ads do not display the 1-800-CONTACTS trademark.

This case is important decision in the developing law of the use of keywords on the Internet.

  • Read the case here

Continue Reading Second Circuit Holds that Use of Competitor's Name to Trigger Pop-Up Ads Does Not Violate Trademark Law

Yesterday’s masters of the universe are today’s cosmic dust.
Anon
_____________________

What Were They Thinking? A case that has received enormous attention in Massachusetts is the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers investigation into the activities of several attorneys for the defendants in the Demoulas case, a state court case involving claims of breach of fiduciary duty surrounding the ownership of a large New England supermarket chain.

The case itself was a legal odyssey, spanning years and numerous state court decisions, but it is the aftermath of the litigation that stunned lawyers in Massachusetts and around the country. The losing defendants, dissatisfied with the decision of State Superior Court Judge Maria Lopez (who has since resigned in ignominy over a criminal molestation sentencing fiasco) and suspecting bias on her part, concocted a charade intended to induce the judge’s then law-clerk to disclose the inner workings of the judge’s chambers while the case was in litigation, and presumably prove that the judge’s clerk, rather than the judge herself, wrote the final (and most important) decision in the case.

The saga of how Gary Crossen (then of Foley, Hoag & Eliot, and former ethics counsel to two Massachusetts Governors), Richard Donahue (a former President of the Massachusetts Bar Association, chair of its Commission on Professionalism and President of Nike, Inc.), and Kevin Curry, (a former Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General, lured the judge’s former law clerk out-of-state in order to tape record his “confession,” attempted to bully him into signing an affidavit, conducted surveillance on him, and more, is described in agonizing detail in the 229 page decision. As a fan of hard-boiled detective novels (including Boston’s current claim to fame, Dennis LeHane, author of Mystic River and other engrossing works), I can only say that in Boston, reality is stranger than fiction.

After years of hearings and delays Bar Counsel issued her decision recommending the “ultimate sanction,” disbarment of all three attorneys. Her decision is now working its way through the Board of Bar Overseers and will ultimately be in the hands of a single Justice of the State Supreme Judicial Court. The consensus in the community appears to be that bar counsel’s decision will be followed.

Once again, we ask, “what were they thinking”? Even if the Demoulas lawyers had established that the Judge’s clerk had “done it” (written the fatal decision, that is), so what? What would they have done with that information? Used it as a basis to attack the integrity of the decision? Hardly a winning strategy.

  • You can read the case here

Continue Reading The Story of the Demoulas Fortune and the Judge’s Clerk

A word to the wise ain’t necessary, it’s the stupid ones who need the advice.
-Bill Cosby


What Were They Thinking? It fascinates me when lawyers do exceptionally stupid things. One would think that the successful completion of four years of college and three years of law school (not to mention years of experience watching clients do unwise things) would inoculate lawyers against the most foolish forms of human behavior. But, of course, experience shows otherwise. Even experienced lawyers are as likely to be rendered stupid by fear, greed, hatred and jealously, and to act on those emotions, as any other highly educated person.

A recently reported Massachusetts Superior Court case informs on this point. Although this case provides an interesting legal treatment of a contract issue (indeed, so interesting that the case was featured on the front page of Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly), it’s primary appeal is morbid curiosity. What was he thinking?

An attorney in good standing in Massachusetts (who will remain unnamed), was employed as Director of Procurement for Navisite. To make a somewhat long story short, his employment was terminated by Navisite in early 2002. After some back and forth over the terms of his severance, Navisite agreed to give the attorney two weeks severance pay ($5,300) and to pay his first month of COBRA benefits.

The lawyer, however, had other plans. After receiving this agreement from Navisite, he modified the boilerplate release language to provide:

“You will be paid eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars for wages earned, if not paid in full within seven days you will be paid three times this amount along with all your expenses and legal fees, all the officers and directors will be personally liable as well. ” [sic passim]

This language was added in such a way as not to attract Navisite’s attention to the alteration, and was signed and returned to Navisite without any mention of the change.

Navisite’s HR director briefly reviewed the document, didn’t spot the change, and signed the agreement.

Predictably, it was all downhill from there. After receiving the two weeks severance and the one month of COBRA benefits the lawyer made demand for $850,000 on Navisite and Navisite sued to rescind the agreement. The lawyer relied on the Massachusetts doctrine that “in the absence of fraud, one who signs a written agreement is bound by its terms whether he reads and understands it or not or whether he can read or not.” However, a Massachusetts Superior Court Judge had no trouble finding multiple grounds for rescinding the agreement (no meeting of the minds, unilateral mistake, unconscionably), and ordered the attorney to return to Navisite the severance payment he had received

This result was as predictable as rain in November in Boston. One hopes his attorney did not take this case on contingent fee.

Continue Reading Lawyer/Employee Who Secretly Modifies Severance Agreement Before It Is Signed by Employer Loses His Case