by Lee Gesmer | Sep 9, 2008 | Trademark
Meta tags consist of words and phrases that are intended to describe the contents of a website. These descriptions are embedded within the website’s computer code. Although websites do not display their meta tags to visitors, Internet search engines utilize meta tags in various ways. First, when a computer user enters particular terms into an Internet search engine, the engine may rank a webpage that contains the search terms within its meta tags higher in the list of relevant results. Second, when a particular webpage is listed as a relevant search result, the search engine may use the meta tags to provide the searcher a brief description of the web page.
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999
The First Circuit has affirmed a finding of trademark infringement based on the defendant’s use of meta tags to attract potential customers of the plaintiff using search engines to find the plaintiff’s web site. The case is Venture Tape v. McGill tried in U.S. District Court by Judge Morris E. Lasker. The defendant’s actions were described as follows by the First Circuit:
The record contains numerous admissions that meta tags and invisible background text on [defendant’s] website incorporated [plaintiff’s] exact marks. … [Defendant] even admitted that he intentionally used [plaintiff’s] marks for the express purpose of attracting customers …
The background text used by the defendant was “white lettering on a white background screen,” sort of a “poor man’s” meta tag.
If you don’t know what meta tags are, go to any web page, and in your browser click VIEW/PAGE SOURCE (or similar terms, depending on your browser). You’ll see the HTML code for the page, and you’ll see the meta elements in the head section of the document. As best I can recall (and determine, based on a quick Westlaw search), this is the first time the First Circuit has ruled on whether the use of meta tags can give rise to trademark infringement. There are technical and legal arguments that can be made against this conclusion, but they were not discussed by the First Circuit. In fact, the First Circuit appeared to assume that the use of meta tags constituted a violation of the Lanham Act, so long as the traditional criteria for trademark infringement were satisfied.
The 11th Circuit gave the meta tag/Lanham Act issue a much more exhaustive treatment earlier this year in North American Medical v. Axiom Worldwide, but still found liability based on the defendants’ placement of meta tags. However, not all courts agree; for cases where liability was not found, see Standard Process, Inc. v. Banks, (E.D. Wis. April 2008); Site Pro-1, Inc. v. Better Metal, (E.D.N.Y. May 2007) and S & L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2007). For an in depth treatment of this issue see the 2005 Santa Clara Law Review article by Professor Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law.
by Lee Gesmer | Sep 4, 2008 | Patents
We’ve been following the lower courts’ interpretation and application of eBay v. MercExchange since the case was decided by the Supreme Court in May 2006. In eBay the Court held that post-judgment injunctions were not “automatic” for successful patent plaintiffs, but rather that the trial court had to apply the traditional equitable test to determine whether an injunction or ongoing royalties were the appropriate remedy.
In June I gave a presentation at Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education on developments in this area in the two years since the decision. (Warning – the Powerpoint won’t make a lot of sense without the voice-over, but it gives some idea of the landscape).
As I discussed then, a constellation of issues was forming around the question of how to assess future royalties if it is determined that this was the appropriate remedy after final judgment. By then, of course, the jury has gone home. Was it up to the judge to determine the royalty? Would there be a new trial (jury or otherwise) on this issue alone? Would the pre-judgment royalty be used for future royalties (as some courts have done)?
Not surprisingly, a U.S. District Judge in the Eastern District of Texas has taken the first real “shot” at this issue. In early August Federal District Court Judge Clark issued an order in several cases, advising the parties that he expected the issue of future royalties to be tried with liability and past damages. He stated:
Should an injunction issue, a jury finding on a future royalty could be used to set a reasonable amount to be paid into escrow during the period of any stay which might be granted. If an injunction is not warranted, the jury verdict might be used by the parties as one factor in agreeing on a license, or by the court in arriving at an ongoing royalty rate for a compulsory license. In either case, time and expense can be saved by having the damages experts testify once, rather than hold a separate mini-trial on the issue of future damages post-verdict. This procedure would encourage the experts to keep their testimony about past and future damages logically consistent, and to give reasons for any differences.
Judge Clark explained that this procedure would not automatically result in an award of future damages in the amount advised by the jury (as described by the judge, the jury’s findings are not binding on the court), or be determinative in any way of the decision whether to issue an injunction or award future royalties.
Although this procedure would add another dimension of cost and complexity to a patent trial, it may make sense where there is a reasonable likelihood that future royalties (rather than a permanent injunction) will be the final remedy.
However, one would hope that a trial judge would not impose this procedure in cases where a preliminary determination concludes that the likelihood of future royalties is weak (for example, as in the case of direct competition between the patent holder and the defendant). It’s worth watching to see whether this approach catches on with other judges in the EdTX and in other districts, and if so how it evolves.
Damages experts must be sharpening their pencils and working overtime this summer ….
by Lee Gesmer | Sep 4, 2008 | Readings and Novelties, Technology
Here is a link to the slides used by Dr. Irving Wladawsky-Berger (Chairman Emeritus of the IBM Academy of Technology) in his talk entitled Cloud Computing and the Coming IT Cambrian Explosion. This was presented at Xconomy’s Cloud Computing event in Cambridge in June.
While there is no audio, I think the slides communicate the message loud and clear. A favorite expression of mine is “important if true.” On these predictions, I will say “important if prescient.”
by Lee Gesmer | Sep 3, 2008 | Minority Shareholder/Fiduciary Duty, Miscellaneous
U.S. District Court Judge William Young’s recent decision in Talentburst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc. is worth study. Talentburst is the former employer of Raj Pallerla. While employed by Talentburst, Pallerla signed a noncompete agreement with Talentburst. He then resigned and went to work for Collabera, Inc. For ease of reading I’ll refer to these three parties as Former Employer, New Employer and Employee.
When the Former Employer discovered that its Employee had gone to work for New Employer, it pursued an unorthodox legal strategy: rather than sue the employee for breach of the noncompete agreement, it sued only the new employer, alleging that the New Employer had “aided and abetted” a breach of fiduciary duty by the Employee. It also claimed that by hiring the Employee the New Employer “interfered” with the noncompete contract. The case was filed in Massachusetts Superior Court, but the Former Employer was able to “remove” it to federal court (based on diversity jurisdiction). To the Former Employer’s misfortune, the case was drawn by Judge Young, who was almost certain to give the case closer scrutiny than it would have received in state court.
The Former Employer filed a motion to dismiss, which is usually a long shot. However, Judge Young allowed the motion and dismissed the suit on the basis of the complaint alone. In his decision Judge Young reasoned that the Employee, who was a non-managerial “worker bee,” did not owe a fiduciary duty to his employer. The New Employer could not have interfered with a non-existent fiduciary duty, and therefore this claim failed.
As to the tortious interference claim, the judge zeroed in on the requirement of “improper means or motive.” Mere advancement of one’s economic interests is not, however, “improper,” and since the Former Employer couldn’t make anything more than a “generalized” allegation of improperness, this claim failed as well.
I have a few observations about this case.
First, in addition to Massachusetts appellate precedent, Judge Young relied heavily on “unpublished” Superior Court decisions (using Westlaw citations when available). I can’t think of a federal district court decision that has made as much use of Massachusetts trial court decisions as this one. However, Judge Young is a former Massachusetts trial court judge, and he often expresses his great respect for that court. The use of state court decisions is also a function of the Business Litigation Session, which has produced many more written decisions than other sessions of the trial court.
Second, Judge Young rejected the Former Employer’s argument that it was not required to make anything more than a generalized allegation of improper means/motive at the pleading stage, holding the plaintiff to the higher pleading standard established by the Supreme Court in the Bell Atlantic v. Twombly decision in 2007. As noted in this post, this standard has now been adopted by the Massachusetts Superior Court as well. Although Twombly was an antitrust case, this is another example of its broad application, extending here so far as to bar a state tort claim; before Twombly, this case likely would have survived dismissal. It probably would have survived dismissal if it had remained in state court.
Third, and lastly, what the plaintiff/Former Employer had in mind when it sued the New Employer but not its Former Employee (against whom it appears it had the stronger claim) continues to elude me, but the strategy clearly back-fired in a major way.
Bottom line: This case is important precedent in the area of employee breaches of fiduciary duty, by reason of its careful legal analysis and the gravitas of the judge who authored it. I expect the case to become part of every business lawyer’s legal arsenal when issues of employee fiduciary duty are raised.
