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UBS May Be Liable Under 93A For IRA Beneficiary’s “Unsatisfactory Experience”

As we get older many of us own Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). These can hold money contributed directly during our working lives, or through a “rollover” from a 401K plan when we retire from a job. Either way, the money in IRA accounts (which in the U.S. totals more than $2.5 trillion), is held by financial institutions (such as Fidelity, Vanguard and Schwab) who act as custodians for this money. We rely on these custodians to transfer this money to our designated beneficiaries upon our death.

A recent case decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, UBS v. Aliberti, shows how this after-death transfer can go awry, and how difficult it can be to punish an IRA custodian that acts improperly or negligently.

The facts are convoluted, but in essence are as follows. 

UBS acted as custodian for a large IRA owned by Patrick Kenney. After Kenney died in 2013 his friend, Craig Gillespie, sent UBS a letter informing UBS that Gillespie had a claim on the money in the IRA. UBS may have been confused (at least at first), since Kenney had attempted to make Gillespie a beneficiary to two other much smaller IRAs. However, it should have quickly become apparent to UBS that Gillespie had no claim on the money in the large IRA, and the money should have been promptly transferred to the sole proper beneficiary, Kenney’s longtime girlfriend, Donna Aliberti. 

A family conflict may have played some part in this situation. The UBS financial advisor who had originally assisted Patrick Kenney in setting up his IRAs and who was responsible for transferring the IRA to Donna Aliberti was Patrick Kenney’s one-time sister-in-law — Margaret Kenny. When Margaret Kenny first received Donna Aliberti’s request for disbursement of the IRAs she responded by attacking Donna Aliberti as “”a whore” and “the . . . worst piece of filth I have ever encountered.”

Regardless of motive, there then ensued what the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the SJC) described as one and one-half years of “bureaucratic indifference or incompetence and hypersensitivity to risk exposure” by UBS. After 18 months UBS added insult to injury by filing a lawsuit asking the court to determine ownership of the IRA. 

Ms. Aliberti counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of M.G.L. c. 93A, the Massachusetts “little FTC act,” which allows successful plaintiffs to recover up to three times their actual damages plus attorney’s fees.

Finally, after two and one-half years, UBS transferred the IRA to Ms. Aliberti. However, Mr. Kenney’s girlfriend was not appeased, and she refused to dismiss her case against UBS. As improbable as it seems, her case ultimately ended up before the highest appeals court in Massachusetts.

The SJC was faced with two legal issues: did UBS have a fiduciary duty to Ms. Aliberti, and did Ms. Aliberti have a valid claim for violation of 93A?

The court concluded that the answer to the first question was no. The relationship between UBS and Ms. Aliberti was merely a “retail consumer relationship governed by contract.” The fact that the UBS custodial agreement expressly disclaimed a fiduciary relationship was a factor in the court’s conclusion on this issue. In fact, although the court was not called upon to decide it in this case, based on the court’s reasoning UBS (or any other IRA custodian that uses a similar contract), would have a strong argument that it never owed Mr. Kenney a fiduciary duty.

However, Ms. Aliberti was not out-of-court yet. Surprisingly, the court held that UBS could be liable for a violation of 93A, and it remanded the case for a trial on this issue. Surprising, because Chapter 93A is alleged in almost every civil lawsuit in Massachusetts, but it is rarely successful. It hits the mark in cases involving fraud or deception, but infrequently where (as here), the facts suggest negligence or incompetence in the performance of a contract.

At the heart of Chapter 93A is its prohibition of  “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” However, the statute provides no definition of what constitutes an unlawful unfair or deceptive act. The SJC has held that conduct is “unfair” in violation of Chapter 93A if it lies “within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;… whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] whether it causes substantial injury to consumers …” (linkUBS argued that it’s conduct fell outside this definition – rather Ms. Aliberti’s 93A claim amounted to nothing more than an “‘unsatisfactory experience’ in the beneficiary payment process.” (link) The Superior Court judge that heard the case had agreed and dismissed the case.

The SJC reversed, holding that UBS’s conduct may have met the standard for unfairness. UBS dragged its feet in informing Ms. Aliberti that it was freezing the proceeds, willfully failed to communicate with her, forced her to retain counsel, filed an implausible lawsuit, and held back funds to which Gillepsie (Mr. Kenney’s friend), had no valid claim, all of which may rise to the level of “unfairness” under 93A. The case will now go back to the Massachusetts trial court for trial , but the SJC has sent a message that it views UBS’s conduct as violative of Chapter 93A. 

More broadly, the case may have expanded the scope of chapter 93A liability where consumers are the subject of bureaucratic indifference and ill treatment at the hands of large corporations like UBS. As UBS argued (unsuccessfully) “allowing someone who merely had an ‘unsatisfactory experience’ to pursue a Chapter 93A claim would establish a dangerous precedent and flood the courts of Massachusetts with disgruntled customers (or, in this case, non-customers) complaining of bad customer service experiences in the guise of ‘unfair or deceptive’ acts or practices.” (link)

While the SJC didn’t go so far as to create a new legal test for bad customer service, it did seem to open the door to 93A claims based on extreme customer mistreatment. The implication of its decision is that this is a fact-based inquiry, and to some extent it is in the eye of the beholder. Here, there were two beholders – the Superior Court judge (who dismissed the 93A claim), and the SJC, which reinstated it. Going forward, I would expect Superior Court judges to take a more pro-consumer look at 93A claims like the one in this case, and perhaps for corporations to be a bit less bureaucratically indifferent to avoid the risk of 93A liability. 

UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Aliberti, 483 Mass. 396 (2019) 

Update: the case settled out of court in December 2021

Oracle v. Google In a Nutshell

Oracle v. Google In a Nutshell

Oracle’s copyright case against Google has dragged on for nine years. The case has generated multiple federal district court trials and appellate decisions. Hundreds of thousands of words have been written on the case. Academic careers have been built on it (OK, I’m exaggerating, but not by much).

Now that the case is before the Supreme Court a new, even larger audience wants to understand it. However, few people want to struggle through the lengthy court decisions or law review articles.

Here is my summary of the issues in the case in a nutshell. Almost all jargon and many details omitted. 

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First Issue – copyrightability. Oracle owns the Java programming language. Part of Java is an application programming interface (“the Java API”). These are pre-written programs that allow programmers to perform common programming tasks. When Google built its Android smartphone operating system it copied verbatim a significant portion (over 11,000 lines) of the Java API.

The Java API uses commands and syntax that look a lot like computer code. Here’s an example:

The Copyright Act protects computer programs. It defines a computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” Oracle argues that both the text and the structure, sequence and organization of the API fall squarely within this definition.

However, the Copyright Act excludes from copyright protection “methods of operation,” a term that is undefined. Google argues that the Java API is a method of operation, and therefore not copyright-protected.

The Federal Circuit held that the text and the structure, sequence and organization of the Java API are protected by copyright. Google is asking the Supreme Court to reverse that holding.

Second issue – fair use. Even if the Java API is copyright-protected Google has a second defense – that it’s use of the Java API is fair use. A jury decided this issue in Google’s favor. Oracle appealed, and the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Google’s use of the Java API is not protected by fair use. Google is asking the Supreme Court to reverse that holding.

What happens next. If the Supreme Court holds that the Java API is not copyright-protected, Google wins and the case ends. If it holds that Google’s use of the Java API is fair use Google wins and the case ends. 

If the Court rules in favor of Oracle on both issues (upholding the two Federal Circuit decisions) the case will be remanded for a trial in the district court to determine Oracle’s damages. Oracle is expected to ask a jury to award it $9 billion.

That’s it, in a nutshell.

If you want to explore the case in more detail go to my Oracle v. Google Resources Page.

Supreme Court Will Decide if “generic.com” Trademarks Are Entitled to Trademark Protection

Supreme Court Will Decide if “generic.com” Trademarks Are Entitled to Trademark Protection

Have you ever used the website booking.com to make a hotel reservation? If you are familiar with this site and I asked whether you thought BOOKING.COM is a brand name or a generic term, what would you say? Odds are you’d say it is a brand name – 75% of people surveyed thought so.1

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (the USPTO) doesn’t challenge those survey results. However, it doesn’t think BOOKING.COM is entitled to trademark registration. It concluded that BOOKING is generic for an online hotel reservation service, and adding a top-level domain name (“.com” in this case) doesn’t change that, irrespective of survey results showing that consumers view it as a brand.

The owner of the trademark, Booking.com B.V. (“Booking”), appealed, and after grinding its way through the USPTO and the courts for eight years this dispute has arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court.

The issue presented to the Court is this: you can’t register (or enforce) a generic trademark. But what if you add a top-level domain name like “.com” to the generic term? Does that take the mark out of the generic category (making it “descriptive”) and open the door to registration, assuming the owner can prove secondary meaning?2

The courts — and the USPTO — have made something of a muddle of this issue. The USPTO asserts that there’s a circuit split on trademark protection for “generic.com” trademarks. There may be, but this is not as clear as it could be. To make matters worse, the USPTO has been inconsistent on the issue. It disallowed registration for BOOKING.COM in the current case, but it has allowed registration for other apparently generic marks, such as CHEAPTICKETS.COM, CHEAPROOMS.COM, UNIVERSITYJOBS.COM, DIAPERS.COM and BUYLIGHTFIXTURES.COM.

The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to straighten things out.

Booking, the plaintiff in the case now before the Supreme Court, owns the booking.com domain name, and claims BOOKING.COM as a trademark.

“BOOKING” is a generic term for hotel reservation services, or so the USPTO and the federal courts concluded. (link) There’s no question that if you started a brick-and-mortar hotel reservation business and called it BOOKING or BOOKING, INC., you’d be unable to register those terms or claim an enforceable trademark in them.3

However, Booking argues that under the Lanham Act’s “primary significance” test for generic marks the key issue is what the public understands the composite mark BOOKING.COM (“booking” + “.com”) to refer to. It relies on its survey evidence, which established that 75% of consumers view BOOKING.COM as a brand, and it argues that it’s logically and grammatically impossible to use the term BOOKING.COM as a generic term for anything.  

Booking’s arguments persuaded a federal district court and the Fourth Circuit, that BOOKING.COM is descriptive.

The USPTO’s counter-argument is that adding “.com” to a generic term is analogous to adding “Inc.” to a generic term and, under long-established law, adding an identity-designation such as “Inc.” to a generic term does not convert it to a protectible mark. Just as no company could register a trademark in “BOOKING, INC.,” Booking should not be permitted to register a trademark in “BOOKING.COM.” The PTO asserts that the “.com” does nothing more than tell the public that the user operates an online business, much as “Inc.” tells the public that the user is a corporation. It does not create a “descriptive” (and therefore potentially protectable) trademark.

The outcome of this case is a close call. However, in my view Booking has the better side of the case. The USPTO’s central argument – that a top-level domain such as “.com” creates a commercial impression analogous to “Inc.” or “Corp.” – seems questionable. However, even if the Court does rule for Booking, the question remains whether the Court will place “GENERIC.COM” trademarks into the established category of “descriptive” trademarks (as Booking argues) or carve out a separate legal standard for generic.com marks (or a generic word paired with any other top level domain name). For example, the Court could require that generic.com marks meet a more rigorous, sui generis standard of secondary meaning to be eligible for registration. 

If the Court does decide that GENERIC.COM trademarks are protectable, I expect that we will see many more of them – perhaps even a mini-gold rush to secure domain names with generic second-level domain names. And, companies that can establish secondary meaning, like Booking, will have stronger grounds on which to freeze out potential competitors who use close variants of generic.com marks. Imagine how Booking might respond to a competitive domain name such as HOTELBOOKING.COM or EBOOKING.COM. Very likely the owners of these domains would receive a cease and desist letter, followed by an infringement lawsuit if they didn’t comply with Booking’s demands.

The Fourth Circuit decision in this case and the cert. petitions are available on the case’s SCOTUS blog page. Eventually, merits briefs, amicus briefs and the Court’s opinion will be available there as well. (link)

FOOTNOTES:

Dirty Politics – How is This Like Lawyering?

“When they go low, we go high” Michelle Obama

“You can’t waller with the pigs and not get dirtyAnon

As I’ve watched the political events of the last few years I’ve heard each side argue that their side needs to “fight dirty” to match the tactics of the opposing party.  

I’m not going to voice an opinion on the political issues raised by these arguments, but I’ve learned one thing from personal experience: if you are an ethical litigator you are likely to be faced with a similar personal challenge at some point during your career. Sooner or later, and probably more than once, you’ll have a case where opposing counsel behaves borderline unethically, or even over the line. The list of ways in which a lawyer can skirt the rules to do this are countless. If you’re on the receiving end it can be upsetting and infuriating.

You, as the ethical lawyer, can’t change your opponent’s conduct. You can complain to the judge overseeing your case, but this is often a futile effort  – judges have better things to do than oversee the conduct of lawyers, and they often are dismissive when they are asked to do so. The legal profession is expected to regulate itself, so unless the conduct is extreme and obvious, judges will usually remind the lawyers that they are professionals, admonish them to act like it, and send them on their way. Litigation can be like a football game where the players know the rules but are told to apply them themselves, without referees.

So, you face a choice: do you respond in kind, or do you “go high”?

There are two parts to this decision. The first is the conversation you hold with yourself and your colleagues. You’re an ethical lawyer, and you may say to yourself, “opposing counsel is behaving in a way that I think is unethical, but I will maintain my values. I will ‘go high.’ I won’t let myself be dragged into the mud. I’ll create a record and I’ll let the judge know when I think it will be effective, but I won’t let this lawyer drag me down to his or her level.” 

Good thinking, but you still have a problem.

The problem is that your client may not agree with you, and this adds to the discomfort of your situation. In the eyes of the client, if the opposing party crosses the line, so should you. By not doing so, they may think you’re putting their case at a disadvantage. And, they may be right!

So, what do you do?

I don’t have any easy answers for a lawyer facing this situation, just as I don’t have an answer for people who may be struggling with this dilemma in the political world. However, I know that, between the natural instinct to fight fire with fire and client pressure, it can be difficult not to be dragged down by an unethical lawyer.

Fortunately, after 40 years of experience I’ve encountered this situation only a few times. In at least one case I can think of the client hired a new lawyer – one whose values were more in tune with those of the client. The client didn’t make it explicit, but it was clear what was going on – the client wanted a junkyard dog lawyer that would counter the opposing junkyard lawyer, and I didn’t fit the bill. Sorry.

In a couple of other cases I told the clients that I would not let the opposing lawyer force me to act unethically, and the clients accepted that.

If (or when)  this happens to you, my advice is to continue to “go high.” It may be hard to take, but when you look back on your career from the perspective of many years or decades, you’ll like yourself a lot better, which is all that really matters in the end.